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was simply a prophet before his time, the value of whose insights we 
are only now coming to appreciate. But one cannot argue this and 
argue at the same time that Madison is an altogether reliable guide 
to the shared understandings of his time-in other words, to the 
original meaning of the Constitution. 
We should remind ourselves that no one's views, not even 
those of the founding father, can be said to represent and reflect 
what was agreed to in particular constitutional provisions. And the 
scholar and the constitutional interpreter want, precisely, to know 
what was held in common. We want to know how the words and 
concepts that were used in constructing constitutional provisions 
were understood by the generality of politically active persons who 
used them and debated them. The ideas and beliefs of a James 
Madison or a James Wilson (or a John Bingham) are valuable in 
helping us to draw an intellectual map of a piece of our constitu-
tional past, but their views must never be confused with the map 
itself. Madison without Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, Wil-
liam Patterson, George Washington, John Adams, and Fisher 
Ames, is a tinkling symbol-sometimes one with a sweet clear note, 
perhaps, and always audible in the score, but not uniquely carrying 
the meaning of the score itself. 
THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL CHOICE: 
THE ROLE OF PROVISIONAL REVIEW IN A DEMOC-
RACY. By Paul R. Dimond.! Ann Arbor, Michigan: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press. 1989. Pp. vi, 163. $27.50. 
Robert J. Steamer 2 
As history so painfully reminds us, nations that have not dis-
covered an institutional means of accommodating that abiding ten-
sion between popular rule and limited government court political 
instability, a condition which inevitably leads to the degradation of 
the constitutional order and the loss of democracy. In the Ameri-
can system judicial review has been the primary mechanism for pre-
serving the symmetry of the constitutional structure, as it has 
enabled the Supreme Court to resolve power conflicts between the 
states and the nation, as well as between the president and Con-
gress, and to validate and refine the individual rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution. Even after two hundred years of practice, how-
I. General Counsel, Investment Firm. 
2. Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, University of Massachusetts at Boston. 
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ever, perennial questions tug at the nation's conscience, indicating 
that judicial review is not an unqualified success. How can the 
Court make legitimate choices when the phrases of the Constitution 
are open-textured, so that their meaning depends upon the discre-
tion of the judges, a discretion from which personal predilections 
can never be totally eliminated? And if the Justices make a colossal 
error--one that is unacceptable to an overwhelming majority of the 
people-how can the damage be repaired with a minimum of shock 
to the system? In this volume Paul Dimond joins the distinguished 
group of scholars who have tried to answer such questions. 
Dimond's thesis is that judicial rulings in constitutional cases 
should be understood as provisional rather than final, as a means of 
initiating a continuing dialogue with the people rather than as judg-
ments forever binding on the people. Dimond contends that he is 
not offering a precise description of how the Supreme Court acts or 
should act but is only proposing a new way of thinking about its 
decisions. "Provisional review," he suggests, "provides a different 
lens through which to see how the Court may interact with the peo-
ple over time in interpreting the Constitution." Seen in such a light, 
the Court's decisions simply posit a point of view which initiates a 
national dialogue on a constitutional issue. 
Divided into two sections, the book first examines the indeter-
minate nature of the American constitutional structure and pro-
poses a theoretical foundation for the author's thesis; the second 
section deals with the idea of promoting a national debate over the 
meaning of the Constitution through the use of provisional review. 
Confronting the dilemma of judicial review in a democracy, Di-
mond begins with a critique of three areas of judicial decision-mak-
ing: the segregation cases, federal-state conflicts, and the Bill of 
Rights. 
Among the most open-ended of the Constitution's clauses are 
those of the fourteenth amendment, and thus in Brown v. Board of 
Education we see a clear instance of judicial choice. The Warren 
Court, without any mandate in the language of the equal protection 
clause, nor so much as an allusion to racial separation in the debates 
surrounding its adoption, declared segregation in the public schools 
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, argues Dimond, interpreting the 
equal protection clause as prohibiting such "caste discrimination" is 
not inconsistent with the text, or the framers' intentions. Though 
not compelled, the decision was well within the range of legitimate 
choices authorized by the Constitution. What about Plessy v. Fer-
guson? Just as the decision in Brown was appropriate, the ruling in 
Plessy was not, since the Justices in the latter case ignored the anti-
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caste principle which, according to Dimond, is at the core of the 
equal protection clause. It is the violation of this principle, the rele-
gation of an out-group minority to second class status, that justifies 
the Court's finding of a denial of equal protection. 
In his treatment of federal-state conflicts Dimond urges the 
Supreme Court to resurrect the privileges and immunities clause of 
the fourteenth amendment as a standard for defining "fundamental 
national rights of membership in the national community that may 
also bind the substance of state law." Such an interpretation of this 
presently lifeless clause, though not compelled, would be a legiti-
mate exercise of provisional judicial review, and would merely initi-
ate a dialogue about which individual national rights should bind 
the states. 
Concerning the Bill of Rights, Dimond defends judicial in-
validation of acts of Congress in three areas: "representation-rein-
forcing" values with respect to the first amendment and to congres-
sional reapportionment (John Hart Ely's view); the anti-caste limits 
on congressional lawmaking; and the clear statement rule, meaning 
that Congress must avoid ambiguity and legislate with clarity in 
constitutional areas or face judicial invalidation of its handiwork, 
such invalidation, of course, being provisional. Thus "the Court re-
tains the authority to assure that the national lawmaking process is 
in fact representative .... " 
In the concluding half of the study Dimond explores the tech-
niques by which provisional review might operate in the areas of 
free speech, discrimination, abortion, and education. He suggests at 
the outset that none of the structural limits that provisional review 
imposes on national legislation compels Congress to reach any par-
ticular result; they require only that Congress act in a manner con-
sistent with representative democracy, that it not prejudicially harm 
any out-group, and that it carefully articulate the constitutional is-
sues. Using hypothetical illustrations, Dimond purports to resolve 
constitutional issues through a provisional review that involves a 
sort of constitutional game of catch in which Court and Congress 
throw the ball back and forth. Where the ball comes to rest de-
pends upon which player makes the wiser decision, but even then 
the game begins again when the national "ongoing dialogue" sug-
gests that the law needs revision. While the Court has never overtly 
embraced the structure of provisional review, says Dimond, histori-
cally "the Court's judgments have been provisional in fact." So 
long as the Court's decisions are not viewed as final, the conflict 
between judicial review and representative democracy is resolved. 
After observing that provisional review has existed in practice, 
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Dimond then suggests that the Court need not embrace it in all of 
its aspects at once. I find this confusing. If we already have had it, 
why the concern about how suddenly to adopt it? 
In part the confusion is dispelled by Dimond's imaginative pro-
posal that the Court use the privileges and immunities clause rather 
than the due process clause "as the source for positing substantive 
national rights of individuals under section 1 of the fourteenth 
amendment as against the states." For example, Dimond purports 
to deflect the usual objections to Roe v. Wade by positing the right 
either of the unborn child or of the woman who wants an abortion 
as a privilege of national citizenship. This would be "provisional" 
since Congress might then provide a different answer, which answer 
again would be subject to judicial review. In this hypothetical case 
Dimond suggests that Congress might enact a Pro-Life-Pro-Mother 
Act which would, among other things, regulate abortions, provide 
pregnancy leaves, fund unwanted childbearing and require paternal 
support for all children. Alternatively, Congress might enact a 
State Choice Act on Bearing Children, authorizing each state to es-
tablish its own policy as long as it contains no anti-woman bias. In 
reviewing state legislative responses to the national statute, the 
Supreme Court would provide a continuing dialogue with the peo-
ple over the abortion issue. That is, the Court, having espoused 
either a pro-choice or pro-life position, each being a valid possibility 
as a privilege of national citizenship under the fourteenth amend-
ment, would simply set the stage for renewed congressional action 
and further judicial review. In sum, Dimond purports to resolve 
the conflict between policymaking by an unelected, life-tenured 
Supreme Court and representative government by (I) giving Con-
gress the power to override the Court's interpretation of most na-
tional rights that bind the states, and (2) limiting judicial review to 
the process of lawmaking with the exception of "a surprisingly few 
substantive values enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Thus, provi-
sional review provides a structure for judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution that is consistent with the nation's commitment to rep-
resentative democracy." 
One's first reaction on reading this thoughtful and provocative 
study is that it is more descriptive of what is than of what ought to 
be done. The book's thesis largely turns on the meaning of the 
word "final." Constitutional decisions have rarely been final in the 
sense of permanent; most are eventually modified by judicial rein-
terpretation; some lose status simply by desuetude; a few are termi-
nated by constitutional amendment. Eventually the dynamic of 
representative government does have its way, and with a few nota-
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ble exceptions constitutional decisions have been final only for peri-
ods ranging from three years (Flag Salute Cases) to fifty-eight years 
(Plessy to Brown) to ninety-six years (Swift v. Tyson to Erie Railroad 
v. Tompkins). Most do not last without modification for even a gen-
eration. Witness those memorable decisions of the Warren Court, 
Miranda v. Arizona and Baker v. Carr, both of which have under-
gone considerable revision. 
The most prominent and controversial decisions of the 1988-89 
Term-abortion, affirmative action, and flag burning-moved very 
swiftly into the arena of national debate, precisely the process advo-
cated by Dimond. This is not to suggest that the Court consciously 
regarded its decisions as provisional, only that they were so in fact. 
In those difficult areas one suspects that is what they will always 
be-"final" only for an indeterminate period. It seems doubtful, 
however, that any Supreme Court in the foreseeable future will 
openly call its decisions "provisional"; any such concession would 
undermine Marbury v. Madison. 
My only basic criticism of this carefully reasoned, innovative 
argument has to do with Dimond's inability to transcend relativism 
in discussing constitutional interpretation. Clearly, judicial choice 
is a fact of life in all appellate courts in all governmental systems. 
Under written constitutions which are imprecise because of the ne-
cessity for generality in fundamental law, a judge is put to the ulti-
mate test of competence, integrity, and disinterest when he must 
choose among several options in hard cases. In Dimond's scenario, 
if the constitutional language is vague and original intent is unascer-
tainable (occasionally but not always the case) the Court makes a 
choice followed by a national debate with an ultimate resolution 
based upon the popular will. This is not constitutionalism but pop-
ulism. Constitutionalism is supposed to limit popular government. 
Judicial review after all was born of a Federalist distrust of democ-
racy. When constitutional language and original intent are unclear, 
there still are right choices and wrong choices, but right and wrong 
are devoid of any permanent meaning in a relativistic framework 
where no standard exists. We need to recall that the framers--of 
the original Constitution and of the Civil War amendments-were 
nourished by the natural law tradition, embracing the notion that 
all human beings possess equal dignity and equal worth. That is 
why the Court was clearly wrong in Plessy and clearly right in 
Brown. The abortion issue is much more complex, because two an-
tagonistic rights are at stake, and nothing in the language or spirit 
of the fourteenth amendment supports either Roe or its opposite. 
Dimond's proposed solution to the abortion problem begs the issue, 
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since it ultimately becomes a question for national debate and solu-
tion by representative bodies. Why not leave unspecified constitu-
tional rights with the legislatures in the first place? 
It is unlikely that a national consensus will ever be reached on 
a fixed set of rules for the exercise of judicial review so long as right 
and wrong remain relative terms determined by counting votes. 
Only if we return to the founders' public philosophy can we retain 
the spirit of constitutional government. Otherwise, constitutional 
choices are made on the basis of personal preference. We cannot 
expect the Constitution and a stable American system to survive the 
onslaught of the Jacobin ideology which permits personal desires to 
determine public policy. Such an attitude will not preserve history's 
most successful constitutional order nor that noble document "in-
tended to endure for ages to come" upon which it is based. 
CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION. 
Edited by Terence Ball' and J.G.A. Pocock.2 Lawrence, Kan-
sas: University of Kansas Press. 1988. Pp. x, 218. $25.00. 
Stephen A. Conrad 3 
Most of the essays in this volume originated as papers for pres-
entation at an April 1987 conference at the Folger Institute for Ren-
aissance and Eighteenth-Century Studies, where Professor Pocock 
has for some time now been a leading presence in collective reflec-
tion on how best to approach the history of political thought. It's 
no surprise, then, that the book offers methodological self-con-
sciousness aplenty. But if anything, Professor Ball's distinctive 
methodological commitments are even more apparent here than are 
Pocock's. Indeed, some of Ball's fellow contributors to this volume 
have taken a stand squarely with him in these commitments, which 
look to the current Begri.ffsgeschichte ("conceptual history") move-
ment in Germany as a guide for improving the study of the history 
of Anglo-American political theory. To be sure, several of the es-
says collected here don't show any special affinity with this new 
school of conceptual history; but what's most noteworthy about the 
volume overall is how so many of them do. 
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